FUNCTIONAL
CONVERGENCE: A WAY FORWARD TO IMPROVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN MALAYSIA
Putri
Syaidatul Akma Mohd Adzmi1
1 Multimedia University Jalan Ayer Keroh Lama, 75450
Melaka. Email: syaidatul.adzmi@mmu.edu.my
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ABSTRACT |
Keywords: Corporate
Governance; Functional Convergence; Ownership and Control; Outsider System;
Insider System; |
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Malaysia is generally
characterized as having concentrated ownership structure in its corporate sector
dominated by family-owned and state-owned companies. Although there seems to
be a shift in ownership and control, there is nevertheless preservation of
concentration of ownership and control. In contrast, the Anglo-American
system has a dispersed ownership system which has the characteristics of an
active share market and takeovers, high market transparency and rigorous
disclosure standards. Despite the obvious differences, the concentrated
ownership systems have been transplanting Anglo-American laws, regulations,
codes and guidelines into the body of their corporate governance frameworks
in the hope of precipitating corporate governance reform and strengthening
financial and economic standards. Although the main objective of convergence
of corporate governance is to improve a country’s governance standard, the
widespread reforms by way of converging practices have the potential to
isolate the domestic problems. In particular, the mismatch of legal rules and
regulations between dispersed ownership systems and concentrated ownership
systems. Thus, this paper will look at the popular concept of convergence of
corporate governance as a method to ameliorate the differences between
systems. This paper argues that functional convergence can create a corporate
governance structure that is closer to home without resort to direct formal
regulation that carries the risks of cosmetic changes to the system. Examples
from the US and the UK will be of useful insights to provide a sound solution
to improve corporate governance in Malaysia. Publisher All rights reserved. |
INTRODUCTION
Corporate
governance regimes have traditionally been broadly categorised into two types
of ownership and control, namely insider and outsider systems, which entail
different monitoring structures to counter specific problems. Outsider system
have dispersed share ownership structure, with a number of individual
shareholders and due to that, many have little or no incentive to monitor the
managers because their shareholding in the company is so small to give them the
power to do so (Rachagan and Nariman, 2013; MR Salim, 2009). Thus, outsider
system tend to have advanced and liquid equity markets which allows the
minority shareholder to exit as a solution. This has been seen as a method to
discipline the management; that is, market for corporate control (Reisberg and
Lowry, 2012).
In the meanwhile, the insider system is significant with not just families
and banks as a source of funding and control but also employees, non-financial
corporations and the State. There is no separation of ownership and control, as
it is owned and controlled by major shareholders indicating a concentrated
ownership pattern. Employees, creditors, the State and shareholder have an
input into control. In insider system, managers are supervised by the
concentration in ownership, or known as the blockholders. The insider
relationships, substantial horizontal coordination among producers, and various
stakeholder claims other than the shareholders were accepted in insider system.
Despite the obvious differences, the concentrated ownership systems have
been transplanting Anglo-American laws, regulations, codes and guidelines into
the body of their corporate governance frameworks in the hope of precipitating
corporate governance reform and strengthening financial and economic standards.
Although the main objective of convergence of corporate governance is to
improve a country’s governance standard, the widespread reforms by way of
converging practices have the potential to isolate the domestic problems. The
differences in both systems tend to be ignored by law reformers and policy
makers. In particular, the mismatch of legal rules and regulations between dispersed
(outsider) ownership systems and concentrated (insider) ownership systems.
Furthermore, the recent 2008 economic crisis challenged a host of established
conceptions and theories of effective corporate governance.
Thus, this paper will look at the popular concept of convergence of
corporate governance as a method to ameliorate the differences between systems.
This paper argues that functional convergence can create a corporate governance
structure that is closer to home without resort to direct formal regulation
that carry the risks of cosmetic changes to the system. Functional convergence
can bridge the gap between internationally recognised standards and national
norms and cultures and may create a corporate governance structure that is
closer to home. I will highlight the different problems that are addressed in
formal convergence. Most examples highlighted herein will be from the United
States because, having flexible and changeable laws, the features of the United
States’ system are better than others in facilitating functional convergence.
CONVERGENCE AS A METHOD
Convergence in
corporate governance occurs when there is similarity between governance
practices in different countries. Convergence is “the process or state of
com[ing] together from different directions so as eventually to meet’ and
‘gradually chang[ing] so as to become similar or develop something in common”
(Oxford Dictionaries, 2010). A primary objective of socio-economic convergence
is to make uniformity of law appear simultaneously possible and desirable
(Teubner, 1998).
Convergence of corporate governance is not just about formal legal
convergence, but also about broader market-institutional convergence (although
arguably the same fundamentals dynamics and difficulties are involved in both).
Since corporate governance is continually undergoing a process of gradual
change, Wymeersch (2002) identifies convergence as the evolution of corporate
governance, which improves the corporate decision-making process and places
importance on what the shareholders and investors want.
Though it is possible to achieve a total adoption of law, convergence
carries the risk of occurring only on the surface of the law and not within the
deeper structures of the legal rules, mentalities and epistemologies, because
each legal structure is historically and culturally unique and cannot be
completely replaced. The factors that drive convergence may include securities
market integration, migration to foreign stock markets and international
harmonization of standards (Coffee, 1999).
Product market
pressure and product market competition also have been identified as major
contributing factors driving convergence of corporate governance (Hôpner,
2001). This is because, by having good corporate governance measures,
convergence allows the company to have greater access to capital and gain
credibility with its customers, thus giving the company a competitive advantage
in the global market. Nevertheless, according to Teubner (1998), the efforts of
internalisation of various national legal structures may unintentionally
produce new divergences as consequences. However, despite the above assertions,
there are successful and rapid institutional transfers among Western societies.
THE COSMETIC CHANGES OF FORMAL
CONVERGENCE
The best approach
to understanding law is through its history, origin and development. It is to
be understood that all legal rules are created due to the social, political or
economic factors of the particular nation and, once rooted in its legal
tradition, will tend to live on; these circumstances will often represent a
significant source of what has been termed “path dependency” (Roe, 1995-1996,
2000-2001). In debating which legal (or corporate) systems are more desirable,
Gilson (2001) supports the one which is successful at that particular time.
Gilson argues that the development of the governance of a national system is
usually shaped by “the accident of history or the design of politics” (Gilson,
2001). Two types of convergence as characterised by Gilson (2001): (1) formal
convergence and (2) functional convergence.
According to Gilson (2001), formal convergence (or convergence in form) is
done through legislative amendments of a governance system, or when a country
makes changes to its laws that require the acceptance of best practices. When
two countries adopt similar corporate governance laws, Khanna, Kogan and Palepu
(2006) call it “de jure convergence” as opposed to “de facto convergence” (that
is, convergence of actual practices).
Convergence in form occurs when there are increasing similarities between
different sets of legal frameworks and institutions (Gilson, 2001). According
to La Porta et al. (2000), legal convergence refers to successful changes in
rules and enforcement instruments to some standard. Formal convergence includes
changes in the legal framework, and thus it must go though legislative
processes and requires political support. As legal change requires legislative
action, it is not surprising that formal convergence proceeds more slowly
compared to soft-law governance practices (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2002). Soft
law is a non-statutory and non- binding form of law which usually requires
judgement rather than adherence to prescriptive regulation. It is also known as
principles-based.
Formal convergence is often associated with legislation as it provides the
primary way for a legal change, as it can be very systematic and generalistic
in its purpose and implementation (Watson, 1978). Legislative process can be
long, tedious and time-consuming, as legislation is designed to be stable and
predictable once instituted. To ensure that any law has been thoroughly
examined, discussed and debated, any proposal for a new law and/or changes to
an existing law will typically be subjected to pre-legislative scrutiny whereby
the relevant reform proposal will be tabled, read, examined, debated at length
and voted on by the legislature. Simply put, a legislative bill goes through
several stages that may take years to complete.
This also means that legal instruments such as statutes cannot be quickly
altered to reflect changing events. Although formal rules offer the most stable
instruments, legal instruments such as statutes and by-laws are often not
dynamic enough to operate effectively within robust competitive economies.
While economic entities are (ideally) rapidly adaptable to changing commercial,
economic and technological realities, legal instruments are not (and rightly
so) as legal institutions are made to last (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992).
Legislation has always been known to be rigid. Thus, formal convergence is slow
compared to other methods. Despite the laborious legislative process,
legislators often provide the direction behind every bill that is tabled. Often
the persons adversely affected by any new legislation proposed are a lot more
than those who have an advantage from it, but the profits to the few are more
extensive than the harms to many.
Furthermore, as a matter of convenience, legal reforms have gone a step
further by borrowing pre-existing rules and principles from foreign
jurisdictions instead of allowing laws to develop over time by interacting with
local socio-economic environments (Gillespie, 2006). The principles of law that
are formulated outside a domestic context are used to help construct the local
legal framework. Several examples of developing countries have been observed
whereby the countries were urged to look at the institutional features of the
Western world as a model: for example, the World Bank’s strengthened pressure
for legal harmonisation in developing Asian states, or the OECD’s constant
recommendation of convergence of international standards and practices
(Gillespie, 2006). Often, reformers use laws and institutions from other nations
in an attempt to stimulate immediate economic growth. When a rule is borrowed,
there is no practical experience as to how the rule will work (Watson, 1978).
Although the rule
may look the same after a formal transfer, Legrand (1997) cautions that, it may
have been changed. The assimilation into a new network of legal institutions
and culture can expose the transferred rule to the disparities of episodic
bonds that are rooted out of different legal formations. Legal cultures vary
mainly from the way which they connect their solutions with “episodes of
conflict” (Legrand, 1997, p.120).
The interpretation of an adopted rule is perplexing, as it is subjectively
and intangibly conditioned by a number of factors, such as its historical background,
culture and society, the community of the said rule and the articulation of the
interpreter. This is because different interpretations occur based on different
understandings of the rule adopted. For example, an effort by leading United
States academics to reform Russia’s corporate law regime by importing United
States style corporate law did not deliver the anticipated outcome (Paredes,
2004). The ability to transport both the rule and its intended meaning makes
for a successful transplant; however, based on Legrand’s (1997) statement
above, the original meaning of the rule may not survive the trip from one to
another legal system.
WILL THE CONVERGING PRACTICES BE
TRANSPLANTED IN FORM AND FUNCTION
When embarking
into formal convergence, there is a risk that a law will provide only a
superficial, cosmetic change that may not solve the existing problems in
governance. It is thus important to ensure that the introduction of new laws
(or legal reforms) into a system can and will be able to work hand in hand with
the current legal system and corporate culture. A rule which is too rigid will
eventually have a negative impact on economic growth, and there is a danger of
an unbalanced legislative framework forming, with the potential for over-regulation
on one hand and no regulation on the other. The risk in formal convergence
occurs when countries compete to attract international recognition without any
consideration of their own peculiar political and socio-economic landscapes.
In 2000, Katharina Pistor measured the degree of legal change in 24
transitional economies and her cross-country analysis showed that there is an
inclination towards formal convergence as a result of widespread legal reforms.
Elsewhere, Coffee (2002) observed that complete set of legal reforms, commonly
devised by foreign legal advisors become a wholesale transplantation. Thus, the
outright transplantation of rules from the common law legal systems to the
civil law legal systems, as observed in Pistor’s study, seems to indicate that,
when confronted with external pressures, lawmakers in transitional economies
have no qualms about diverting from their own traditional legal system. This
leads to the occurrence of formal convergence. Although shifts in legal rules
may follow, shifts in the system of corporate governance and the structure of
share ownership may not necessarily occur, especially when the corporate
governance system pre-dates the rules.
From this perspective, one might predict that once this wholesale transplantation
occurs, there will be a corresponding movement towards the system it adopted.
As Coffee (1999, 2002) reminds us, “if legal rules are determined by the system
of corporate governance that pre-exists those rules, then no similar rapid
legal transition should necessarily be expected” (p.86-87). The evidence
brought forward by Coffee (1999, 2002), however, further shows that there are
significant shifts in continental European countries which traditionally have
had concentrated ownership structure. Changes such as the decline of
concentrated structure of share ownership, the increase in listing on European
stock exchanges, the growth of equity markets and increase of corporate
takeovers involving European counterparts may suggest a transition towards the
Anglo-American model. Despite the above changes, however, the insider system
remains entrenched in continental Europe.
It is important to recognize that functional convergence is useful for
jurisdictions that wish to emulate another’s system, typically in order to
create a better governance system for themselves. However, there is a danger
that the applied system will not be implemented at “ground level”. For example,
greater concentration of ownership within a firm can mean that the firm curtails
its capability to increase investment in capital markets. In this respect,
outsider system differs from the insider system. An outsider (Anglo-American)
system is a market-based governance system and has more widely dispersed
shareholdings, whereas an insider system is a relationship-based system and is
mostly controlled by major shareholders, causing it to have a concentrated
ownership structure. Thus, in trying to adopt features characteristic of
outsider system into traditionally insider systems, any outsider system that is
adopted within an insider system must be able to accommodate the concentrated
ownership structure and, at the same time, manage the danger brought about by
large blockholders (Easterbrook, 1997).
Arguably, dispersed ownership denotes that risk can be diversified away and
increase liquidity with lowered capital cost. These features, which are seen in
the majority of public listed companies in the United Kingdom and the United
States, are due to the fact that no single shareholder has enough wealth to
become a large blockholder – and even if a shareholder is wealthy enough, the
risk is too high for them to bear (Easterbrook, 1997). It is thus apparent that
the corporate laws which are applicable in the United States are different in
significant ways from those that have developed in concentrated ownership
systems, as both types of systems have different characteristics and
objectives. Previous studies have established a distinction between legal and functional
convergence (Coffee, 1999). According to La Porta et al. (2000), convergence on
effective investor protection using formal methods requires all-encompassing
legal and regulatory reform, and also judicial reform. On the contrary,
functional convergence appears to be more effective because it does not involve
these reforms. Rather, the latter type of changes are more wide-ranging and
market-driven.
FUNCTIONAL CONVERGENCE
Functional
convergence occurs when institutions adopt foreign practices and bring about
changes in their corporate governance systems without changing their statutory
law. In order for functional convergence to succeed, there must be flexibility
to the existing regulatory instruments. This is to allow the law to act in
response to new conditions without any formal change (MacNeil, 2002). According
to Gilson, functional convergence can only occur when institutions are flexible
enough to adopt amendments without any formal changes: that is, when different
countries perform the same function by using their own pre-existing rules and
institutions. According to Khanna, Kogan and Palepu (2006), when actual
practices of corporate governance are implemented, it is a form of de facto
convergence.
It has been suggested that managers of multinational companies make
reference to international sources when bringing about changes in internal
governance processes. These acts by managers indicate a form of functional
convergence (Sassen, 1998). In essence, functional convergence is a “bottom-up”
process, which only occurs when a company consents to a change in its governing
rules rather than these being enforced at the national level (Bratton and
McCahery, 1999). This happens because, when companies learn from the mistakes
of another’s governance shortcomings and emulate their optimal practices,
governance measures are less rhetorical and more tangible. As the legal
framework in the company’s national system continues unchanged, it not only
creates a more effective and cheaper control tool, but also an instantaneous
one, as it requires no legislative action. Hansmann and Kraakman (2002) assert
that reform of corporate governance practices commonly leads to the reform of
corporate law, largely because it is a matter of private ordering. It is thus
necessary to look into the examples from the United States’ and the United
Kingdom’s corporate governance environments, to determine whether the methods
in the United States and the United Kingdom offer any paradigm for the
development of this idea (which idea) in other environments.
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS IN
THE UNITED STATES
Examples from the
United States can be useful in employing functional convergence in a system,
institution or jurisdiction because of the enabling nature of many of its
rules. When the United States Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced
Rule 14a-8, it opened up a floodgate of shareholder activism (Kahan and Rock,
2010). Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act allows shareholders to force a
company to include a resolution in its proxy materials with minimal cost.
Voting by way of proxy is to allow someone else the right to vote on your
behalf at the general meetings. In case where there is no instruction to vote
in particular way, the usual instance would be that the proxy holders would
vote the shares following the recommendation of the board of directors. The
rule states that management must permit shareholder proposals that form a
“proper subject for action by the security holders” (Gillan and Starks, 2007).
The main advantage of the shareholder proposal rule is that it is inexpensive
for the proponent, as they need not pay any of the printing and mailing costs,
all of which must be paid by the corporation.
For example, under SEC Rule 14a-8, shareholder proposals are merely
advisory in nature. Shareholders may not initiate corporate actions under Rule
14a-8, but may only approve or disapprove of corporate actions placed before
them for a vote (Bainbridge, 2008). These precatory shareholder resolutions
thus represent a low-cost and relatively uncoercive form of activism with no
binding effect (Kahan and Rock, 2010). Therefore, even if a proposal passes
with hundred percent of the vote, there is no requirement by the management to
implement the proposal’s directives. Some view it as an ineffective tool, since
most of the proposals are phrased in precatory language that cannot bind the
board of directors to action.
However shareholder proposals, despite the absence of binding legal effects,
can still be very persuasive. The first incidence (or movement) of shareholder
activism emerged during the mid-1980s when the Council of Institutional
Investors was formed with the intention of acting as a lobbying group for
shareholders’ rights (Gillan and Starks, 2007). It was formed after Jesse
Unruh, who was at that time the California State Treasurer, and a California
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) board member learned about the
abuse of stock buybacks by the board of directors of Texaco with a repurchase
offer that was not advanced to other shareholders, such as CalPERS and
California State Teachers Retirement System (CalSTRS). In this case, a
shareholder proposal was presented to the company to call for an advisory
committee of major shareholders to be created to work with management. However,
upon direct negotiation with Texaco which resulted in an agreement for the
management to nominate a shareholder representative as a candidate to its board
of directors, CalPERS withdrew its proposal (Gillan and Starks, 2007).
CONCLUSION: FUNCTIONAL CONVERGENCE TO BE FACILITATED
This paper has
provided an overview of some of the issues and debates which have emerged
within the literature on the idea of convergence of corporate governance. It
first focused on the question of how a foreign rule may be transplanted into
the domestic culture in the specific context of corporate governance. The
discussion clarified the theories of convergence that have been advanced by
various scholars, particularly the concepts of formal and functional
convergence as developed by Gilson (2001).
Then, the paper highlighted the limits of formal convergence, especially in
attempting to introduce legal changes that are not merely cosmetic, but are
able to function alongside the current legal system and be adapted culturally
without causing any ancillary (detrimental) effects. Thereafter, this paper
examined legal transplants through functional convergence and the need to
facilitate functional convergence as a method for establishing a more localised
and custom-made corporate governance structure within a particular legal
system.
Through the example highlighted in this paper, it is acknowledged that
international standards can provide a certain degree of “learning” between
nations, and thus convergence cannot be abandoned totally. However, the main
objective of convergence can be undermined as reforms have unintended
consequences. The example quoted above highlight the ways in which functional
convergence can be facilitated at the micro-level with more flexible and
adaptable mechanisms. It is hoped that the example from the United States as
highlighted in this paper demonstrate that functional convergence can be relied
on by an insider system to find appropriate corporate governance measures
without resort to formal laws adopted from outsider systems. The state can
apply the functional method of adopting foreign practices without any formal
change to solve the central problem of abuse of blockholder power in the
insider system.
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