ZANZIBAR GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY:
A PANACEA TO POLITICAL OR
ECONOMIC STABILITY?
Said N. Said,*1 Abdul-Nasser H. Hikmany 2
1 Uludağ University, Email:
s.n.said.09@aberdeen.ac.uk
2 International Islamic University
Malaysia, Email: nasser.hamed@live.iium.edu.my
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ABSTRACT |
Keywords: Zanzibar Government of
National Unity; economy; politics; development; sustainable. |
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Zanzibar
celebrated its five years anniversary of the Zanzibar Government of National
Unity (ZGNU) in the year 2015. The decline of ZGNU in 2016 remains to be
confusing and a door wide open for critical legal analysis, which this study
is not in a position to discuss due to limited space for publication. This
study with other things tries to examine and discuss how far the ZGNU has
successfully maintained strong political stability and provides credible
prospects to sustainable economic development in Zanzibar. This study is
based on an analysis of the Zanzibar Laws, journal articles, textbooks,
newspapers and Bank of Tanzania’s (BoT) financial annual reports. The study
finds that though there are a number of short falls arising from the
formation of the ZGNU, it remains to be of an admirable benefit, by bringing
about a strong political stability with a good sustainable economic
development. Publisher All rights reserved. |
INTRODUCTION
A
Government of National Unity (GNU) denotes the concept of two or more political
foes coming to a consensus to bury the hatchet and work together in a new
coalition formation under either Constitutional or Conventional arrangement
(Mapuva, 2010; Nassor & Jem, 2011; Chigora & Guzura, 2011). The former
is established consisting of main rival representatives to achieve national
consensus (Nassor & Jem, 2011), while the latter is formed by two or more
political parties after the election results provide no clear winner (Mason,
2015). Political crisis and civil wars in African countries have made the GNU
as among the most preferred solution to political and economic stability.
GENESIS OF THE ZANZIBAR GOVERNMENT
OF NATIONAL UNITY (ZGNU)
Article
9 (3) of the Constitution of Zanzibar (1984), provides:
Structure of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar
will be of National Unity and the performance of its functions will be carried
out in procedure that will ensure sustainable unity in the aim to achieve
democracy. (Authors’ Interpretation)
Since
the first multiparty election of 1995, CCM (ruling party) and CUF (Zanzibar’s main
opposition party) as the popular political parties in Zanzibar, have been
engaging in a severe-political competition to run Zanzibar government with an
‘electoral wipe-out’ in a show elections surrounded with accusations and
election riggings (Bakari & Makulilo, 2012). This has led to a state of
constant friction and collision between their supporters (Bakari, 2001) and the
use of excessive military intervention against the opposition. In all
elections, from 1995 to 2015, Zanzibar situation has been critical, abuse of
human rights, and the increase of hate-politics are predominately severing
political and economic stability (Human Rights Watch, 2011).
Local and International missions tried to resolve the
conflicts, however, their efforts were dilly dallied and remained fruitlessly.
“Unexpectedly, in 2009, a home-grown initiative between President Amani Karume
(CCM) and the Chief Opposition Leader Seif Sharif Hamad (CUF) ended the bitter
rivalries between their parties for the adoption of power-sharing arrangement
through a Government of National Unity” (Maoulid, 2015). The modus operandi of ZGNU is to provide a
power-sharing between the winner and the opposition party that has won at least
ten percent (Constitution of Zanzibar, 1984) of all presidential votes
or managed to have seats in the Zanzibar House of Representatives (Constitution
of Zanzibar, 1984). It consists, the President and the Second-Vice President,
with some Ministers from the winning party, together with, the First-Vice
Presidents and other Ministers from the opposition party(s). Five years have
elapsed from the day the ZGNU was established, a significant period that could
provide a reasonable test on the successes and failures it has. As Maina (2011)
noted:
While this resolve might sound noble we can only wait
to see how this agreement plays out in the coming years of its application and
whether it works to transform structures of conflict.
ZANZIBAR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Zanzibar’s
definition of economic development is related to the Zanzibar Development
Vision 2020. The main objective of the Vision 2020 is to foster economic
sustainable growth and eradicate poverty completely by 2020 (Zanzibar Vision
2020, 2011). Thus the Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan was introduced in 2002 as
a first step to implement the Vision 2020.
This was later followed by the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and
Reduction of Poverty (titled in Swahili as Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na
Kupunguza Umasikini – MKUZA) which was launched in 2007. Both development
documents place emphasis on trade, agriculture and tourism as growth sectors to
enhance poverty reduction efforts.
As a result of Vision 2020, the definition of economic
development in Zanzibar varies according to the targeted goal. For example the
Zanzibar Investment Policy (2003) aims on achieving an economic development by
having an educated and healthy society (Zanzibar Vision 2020, 2011). The
Zanzibar Tourism Development Policy (2004) states a clear purpose of
introducing an alternative tourism method which is viable to the environment by
allowing tourism to develop in a sustainability method (Zanzibar Vision 2020,
2011). On the other hand, the Agricultural Sector Policy (2003) aims on an
increased and sustainable growth of agricultural production basing on structural
changes, increasing productivity, developing new technology and producing new
products (Zanzibar Vision 2020, 2011).
In regard to Zanzibar’s GDP at market price, it stands
at TZS 1,077,000 and the per capita income is estimated to be USD 667 as of
2013 (BoT, 2014). The annual GDP growth rate in 2014 was 7.4 per cent (BoT,
2014). Compared to developed countries, it is clear that Zanzibar is poor and
has a relatively very small economy (MKUZA II, 2010). Agriculture has been the backbone
of Zanzibar's economy for many years. Although it is small scale farming,
agriculture has been the basic occupation for many people with over 70 per cent
of population relying on agriculture and fishing for its livelihood (Yussuf,
2014). The main farm production has been cloves, spices and fruits. The
Zanzibar government has also designated tourism as a priority sector of the
economy contributing to 80% of the foreign currency (Yussuf, 2014). It
contributes to 27% to the Gross Domestic Product and providing directly twenty
to fourth thousands jobs (Yussuf, 2014).
SUCCESSES OF THE ZGNU
Law
has played an important role in reshaping the present political structures and
economic patterns of Zanzibar under the ZGNU. Amongst its list of achievements
that the ZGNU could count are; the restoration of unity and political stability
as well as accountability and well being of sustainable economic development.
Government Accountability
For
CUF as main opposition party to form ZGNU with CCM as the winner and its
long-run rivalry after 2010, was taken by many as silence killing of democracy
in Zanzibar (Matheson, 2012). Nevertheless, joining in the government was a
better option, because it offered the hope that the opposition and leading
party play a watch dog role to each other, a form of “checks and balances” that
improves government service delivery and accountability (Matheson, 2012).
Since coming into force in 2010 of the ZGNU, there
have been encouraging level of political accountability, where all parties have
been advocating peace, solidarity and place the country’s interests first. For
instances in many of the Zanzibar House of Representatives discussions, back
benchers play critical role to the Governmental debates the main division was
between the government and the ‘back-benchers' instead of the parties. Debates
were conducted in a sense that their degree of influence and accountability to
question what the government was doing received much consideration and there
were strong bond of unity when Zanzibari interests were not fully utilised by
the Government (Zanzibar House of Representatives, 2012). There was a clear-strong cooperation between
CCM and CUF and a notable decrease in political tensions, along with a
noticeable increase in transparency of a political decision-making process,
freedom of expression, and political stability (Nassor & Jose, 2014).
Unity and Political Stability
Before
the constitutional assimilation of ZGNU, there was a huge-social
marginalisation that split Zanzibar society right in the middle (Shivji, 2016).
Coming to the ZGNU was the only opportunity, which Zanzibari employed to bury
hatred and vengeances for the future (Hamad, 2011). The good example of unity
that was shown by the President and his two-vice Presidents together with
Zanzibar people was a big achievement of ZGNU (Yussuf, 2012).
Continuity
The
Constitution provides that any proposal to change the structure of ZGNU must
first be submitted for people’s approval, a consequence that will directly
involve the Zanzibari through a referendum (Nassor & Jose, 2014; Sisk,
2003). There have, however, been claims raised to dissolve ZGNU which were
somehow accepted after the election re-run in 2016. Those who wish the
dissolution might, nevertheless, be discouraged taking in consideration with
the political environment in Zanzibar and the benefits ZGNU has proved. To wipe
out or submit logic criticisms against a constitutionally assimilated
government especially the one intended to bury hatred for prosperity is not by
a day, “the critics would have to
demonstrate that the system has not achieved what it was intended to achieve
and cannot be improved” (Maphai, 1996).
Overall Economic Performance
BoT
2008 records a GDP of 6.50, with an increase to 7.40 by 2014 (BoT, 2014). The
least GDP between 2008 and 2014 was that of 5.40 in 2009 (BoT, 2009). Since the
introduction of ZGNU in 2010, Zanzibar has witnessed a growth of GDP from 6.50,
6.80, 7.00 to 7.40 in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively (BoT, 2011; BoT,
2012; BoT, 2013; BoT, 2014). The main activities that significantly contributed
to the economic growth under ZGNU were transport, communication, construction,
financial intermediation, hotels, restaurants, trade and repairs (BoT, 2014).
Additionally enough, to ensure sustainable economic
development, ZGNU has consolidated economic rebalancing through a change in the
price of cloves (McLaughlin, 2014), whereby, farmers receive around 70-80% of
the World Market price. Before the coming of ZGNU farmers were used to be paid
peanut (Salim, 2014) as punishment against Pemba’s lack of political support to
the CCM government (Onyango & Nassali, 2003).
Gross Capital Formation
Capital
formation in Zanzibar continued to exhibit upward trend since 2011, averaging
TZS 76 billion for the period 2011 – 2014. During 2013, investment increased to
258.9 billion TZS, up from 183.2 billion TZS recorded in 2012 (BoT, 2012; BoT,
2013). Comparing to the Pre-ZGNU period, capital formation was 139.3 billion
TZS in 2008 and by the introduction of ZGNU in 2010, it escalated to 233.9
billion TZS by year 2014 (BoT, 2014). The overall gross capital formation shows
a sustainable economic development (Table 1).
Revenue Performance
Revenue
outturn as at end of 2008 was 110.3 billion TZS. In 2014, income has increased
by threefold at a record of 330.7 billion TZS. A constant growth of revenue can
be studied from 139.7, 149.5, 181.5, 220.0 and 266.2 in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012
and 2013 respectively. Measuring up to the Pre-ZGNU period, revenue performance
was 186.3 billion TZS in 2008 and when the ZGNU came into being in 2010, it
shot up to 469 billion TZS by year 2014 (BoT, 2008; BoT, 2014). The improved
performance was on account of ZGNU enhanced efforts to expand revenue
collection through transfer of PAYE from the Union Government, relative
increase in tourism related activities and increase in imports after completion
of port rehabilitation (BoT 2008; BoT, 2014).
Table
1: Zanzibar Economic Development 2008-2014
Pre-ZGNU |
Post-ZGNU |
||||||
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
2011 |
2012 |
2013 |
2014 |
|
Overall economic performance |
6.50 |
5.40 |
6.70 |
6.50 |
6.80 |
7.00 |
7.40 |
Gross capital formation |
139.3* |
145.2* |
175.9* |
200.9* |
183.2* |
258.9* |
233.9* |
Revenue performance |
110.3* |
139.7* |
149.5* |
181.5* |
220.0* |
266.2* |
330.7* |
Government expenditure |
186.3* |
203.4* |
286.3* |
348.0* |
374.0* |
514.3* |
469.0* |
Development expenditure |
61.8* |
65.5* |
118.7* |
159.7* |
140.1* |
214.1* |
141.7* |
Development debt |
128.2* |
228.7* |
140.4* |
161.8* |
226.0* |
264.1* |
299.3* |
External debt |
62.7** |
62.1** |
62.5** |
79.4 ** |
111.7** |
128.3** |
129.8** |
* billion Tanzanian Shillings (TZS); ** million US
Dollars (USD)
FAILURES OF THE ZGNU
Although the ZGNU faced a
fatal political death after March 2016, there has been a good step taken for
political and economic stability from 2010 to 2015 as enumerated above.
Nevertheless, during its five year survival, the ZGNU depicted sporadic
hostilities of political violence, denial of fundamental rights and
inflammatory words of racism deface the quality of ZGNU. The
following are some of the failures and reason behind limping of ZGNU as a
panacea to political stability and sustainable economic development.
Unidentified of the Root Cause
of the Problem
Any formation of a GNU must be
complemented with a plan to resolve the root causes of violence, without which
this form of Government will not have served any meaningful purpose (Maina,
2011). The root cause of Zanzibar political problem has to be traced into two
aspects; a historical-social marginalisation and absence of a free fair
election. The former is, somehow, less common (Matheson, 2012) but needs
tolerable treatment while the later persistently endangers political stability
to every election since the establishment of political parties in 1950’s
(Michael, 1965; Hamad, 2011; Bakari, 2001).
Had the root cause
been identified; the proposal for ZGNU would have composed reform of having an
independent Electoral Commission that would minimise political influence to its
appointing authority. As the lesson from Kenya (Kenya National Assembly, 1998),
these reforms would have been directed for future elections. Unfortunately the
ZGNU proposal (Zanzibar House of Representatives, 2010) discussed nothing to
election reforms and it is clear that the proposed structure was “to postpone
conflicts rather than to solve it” (Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010) as witnessed
in the 2015 political deadlock due to the nullification of the October 2015
election results by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (Commonwealth Observer
Group, 2015).
Inferiority that ZGNU could
break the Union
Formation of ZGNU was taken
curiously by those who questioned the position of Constitution of the United
Republic of Tanzania (1977) within the new structure that was proposed for
Zanzibar. The first reason was the different political party’s policies that
CCM and CUF have towards the Union. While CCM professes a two tier government
(Tanzania and Zanzibar) CUF supports a three tier government (Tanganyika,
Zanzibar and Tanzania). There are those who are anxious that, difference in
policies would disturb and destabilise the Union. Others have gone further to
question the constitutional power mandated upon Zanzibar President to call for
a referendum. That if it happen the Zanzibar Government is led by CUF; they may
initiate a referendum against the Union (Bakari & Makulilo, 2012). There
is, however, nothing to be afraid from. If England did not bar Scotland to
conduct the referendum in September 2014 why should Tanzania? (Torrance, 2013;
Othman, 2013).
Structural Inefficiency and
Misrepresentation within ZGNU
The structural composition
conferred exclusive power to Zanzibar President. Appointments of Ministers,
Principal Secretaries, Directors and all heads of public sectors remain to be
under the President. Even though the First-Vice-President is the Chief Advisor
of the President, the President is not bound to accept the advice from anyone
(Constitution of Zanzibar, 1984). The political situation in Zanzibar has
created a mistrust-working behaviour that it is likely for the President to
appoint those who are loyal and steadfast with him and his party. “It is hard
to form a sufficient stable government where trust is absent between groups of
the same society” (McCulloch, 2014). Distrust, ill-will and constant tensions
among the parties undermine government stability and reduce the likelihood that
the GNU would dissolve without conflict (Blake et al, 2015). There have been
widespread criticisms against Mr. President’s appointees as incompetent to
cater the needs of the ZGNU. Nonetheless he took those critics in blind eyes.
It has to be remembered that placing in power individuals and groups not fully
committed to power-sharing arrangement for the benefit of the entire populace
will undermine the longer-term goal of preventing resurgence of conflict
(Sriram & Zahar, 2009).
High Development Expenditures
Total
development expenditure reached TZS 214.1 billion TZS in 2013, while in 2008
records show that it was 61.8 billion TZS – the lowest figure in between 2008
to 2014 (BoT, 2013; BoT, 2008). However, development expenditure for 2013 was
41.6% below the annual estimates of TZS 341.1 billion TZS, mainly on account of
low outturn of donor funds particularly for development projects (BoT, 2013).
The same applies in 2011; the development expenditure was 159.7 billion TZS
which is 36.4% below the annual estimate of TZS 251.2 billion TZS (BoT, 2011).
For 2012, development expenditure was 140.1 billion TZS which is 63% below the
annual estimate of TZS 378.9 billion TZS (BoT, 2012). As the years go by,
expenditures of ZGNU keeps on rising and hence undermining Zanzibar’s
sustainable economic development.
Increase of ZGNU Expenditures
In
2013, total ZGNU expenditure reached TZS 514.3 billion TZS, while in 2008
records show that it was 186.3 billion TZS – the lowest figure in between 2008
to 2014 (BoT 2013; BoT, 2008). However, expenditure for 2013 was 21.1% below
the annual estimates of TZS 651.9 billion, mainly on account of low outturn of
donor funds particularly for development projects (BoT, 2013). The same applies
in 2011; the GNU expenditure was 348.0 billion TZS which is 21.7% below the
annual estimate of TZS 444.6 billion TZS (BoT, 2011). For 2012, Zanzibar
Government expenditure was 374.0 billion TZS which is 39% below the annual
estimate of TZS 613.1 billion TZS (BoT, 2012). Annual targeted estimate keeps
on dropping against ZGNU expenditure. Where there is a deficiency of 21.7% in
2011 to 39% in 2012, something must be done to stabilize the economy.
Escalation of Development Debts
Zanzibar
total development debt stock increased from 128.2 billion TZS in 2008 to 299.3
billion TZS in 2014, an increase of 57% (BoT, 2008; BoT, 2014). In 2010,
development debt stood at 140.4 billion TZS and kept on escalating to 161.8,
226.0 to 264.1 billion TZS in 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively (BoT, 2011; BoT,
2012; BoT, 2013). Not surprising that the current government will now spend
more on debt repayment.
Rise of External Debts
Zanzibar
total external debt stock increased from 62.7 million USD in 2008 to 129.8
million USD in 2014, an increase of 52% (BoT, 2008; BoT, 2014). In 2009,
development debt stood at 62.1 million USD and kept on rising to 62.5, 79.4,
11.7 to 128.3 million USD in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively (BoT, 2010;
BoT, 2011; BoT, 2012; BoT 2013). Poverty remained to be the major reason for
ZGNU in borrowing. Unless improvements are made in access to water, health and
shelter, external debts will keep on rising every year.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The
life of ZGNU during the five year period was not in any way a fairy tale or a
love story with a happy ending. ZGNU breathed life and was therefore realistic.
Difficult decisions were made to not only introduce it, but dissolving it. This
study has analysed clearly with evidence the goods and the bads of the ZGNU. It
is high time to take into account the benefits while at the same time
redefining the challenges that faced the GNU.
This study has notably found that political and
economic stability and the prosperity of the ZGNU remain under the auspices of
having, among others, an Independent Electoral Commission that does not espouse
to any political party or appointing authority. Politicians must be clear that,
despite the challenges, the ZGNU has maintained and created a conducive and
stable political situation that is prerequisite to sustainable socio-economic
development in Zanzibar. They must further, work hand in glove, round the clock
to make sure that ZGNU comes back to life stronger, healthier and progressing
for the betterment and well-being of Zanzibar. Where there is no unity there is
neither sustainable socio-economic development nor peace.
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