REFUGEE
MICROENTERPRISES: PROSPECTS
AND CHALLENGES
Omar Kachkar,*1 Mustafa Omar Mohammed,2
Norma Md. Saad,3 Saim
Kayadibi, 4
1 PhD,
IIUM and researcher at the International Shari'ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance
(ISRA) omar@isra.my, omar1399@gmail.com
2 Assoc. Prof. Dr. at Kulliyah of
Economics and Management Sciences International Islamic University Malaysia
3 Prof. Dr. at Kulliyah of Economics and Management
Sciences International Islamic University Malaysia
4 Prof. Dr. at Kulliyah of Economics and Management
Sciences International Islamic University Malaysia
|
|
ABSTRACT |
Keywords: Refugees;
Microenterprises; UNHCR; challenges; prospects; |
|
Economic engagement of refugees and supporting their micro enterprises have been acknowledged long ago by UNHCR and humanitarian agencies
as an effective solution to promote self-sufficiency and
self-reliance of refugees and to improve their socio-economic situations. However,
in terms of implementation, economic engagement of refugees has remained to
minimum levels. The vast majority of
refugees have remained helpless and hopeless in their camps or settlement.
They remain for years unemployed and inactive, struggling with poverty and
suffering with all consequences of the unbearable state of limbo, with
no way forward and no way backwards. This study explores the key challenges facing
humanitarian organizations and relief NGOs in supporting refugee
microenterprises (RMEs). Six interviews have been conducted with experts from
five aid and relief organisations as follows; UNHCR, International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Malaysian Social
Research Institute (MISR), Islamic Aid Malaysia and (IAM), Islamic Relief
Malaysia (IRM). Findings of the interviews indicate to a verity of challenges
encountered by NGOs and humanitarian agencies. On top of these challenges in
the legal challenge and the absence of the supportive environment in the host
countries, followed by the lack of financial resources to support the RMEs
and the lack of experienced institutions to cater microfinance and
microenterprise for refugees. This study concludes that despite all the
challenges, supporting microenterprises for refugees should be given adequate
concern due to the changes in refugee trends in terms of the unprecedented
number and in terms of the length of the average stay of refugee in exile and
due to the successful stories of refugee micro-entrepreneurs when they are
encouraged with the supportive business environment in host countries. Publisher
All rights reserved. |
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a phenomenal
change in refugee trends around the globe. The change has been evidenced in
terms of the unprecedented increase of the number of refugees which has been
for the first time since 1992, the number of refugees passed the 20 million
thresholds (20.2 million) (UNHCR, 2015d) and also in terms of the long stay of
refugees in exile. It is believed that over three quarters of refugees around
the world are stuck in protracted situations, the average stay of refuges in
protracted situations is believed to last approximately for 17 years up from 9 years in the early
1990s (Betts, 2013) and ( Milner and Loescher, 2011). Supporting
refugee microenterprises (RMEs) is one essential part of the economic
engagement of refugees which could also include, income generating projects,
microfinance initiatives and livelihood support in general.
Economic engagement of
refugees has been proposed as one of the effective durable solutions for
refugees in general and in particular for refugees in protracted situations. As
such UNHCR engagement in refugees’ livelihood started in early 1960s in the
wake of the tremendous influx of refugees in particular in sub-Sahran Africa. Planned
rural settlements were established with two-phase objectives; phase one:
assisting refugees to settle on the land and become self-supporting and phase
two: to prepare refugees for integration with local communities. Nevertheless,
Due to a number of economic, political and social factors, this effort has not
been very successful. Most of the refugee settlements were found unable to
achieve or sustain economic self-sufficiency and many refugees were not
integrated into their host countries (Stein, and Clark,1990).
The early 1980s
witnessed renewed calls for more effective solutions for refugees especially
for those in protracted situations in Africa.
The International Conference on Assistance
to Refugees in Africa, (ICARA) I and II were organized by UNHCR
and UNDP with slogans such as "Time for Solutions." and "refugee
aid and development." ICARA I, aimed at raising funding from donor states
for the emergency relief and the ACARA II with the objective of implementing
development-oriented activities in refugee populated areas, which may benefit
both refugees and locals populations. Unfortunately, the ICARA I failed because
it did not meet the expectations of host countries to collect reasonable
funding whereas ACARA II strategy met with little success: seemingly due to
some fundamental contradictions in the way that refugee-hosting countries and
donor states perceived the objectives of the strategy; and second, because the
large-scale famine that occurred in the Horn of Africa in 1984-5 that shifted
the priorities of international agencies from self-reliance to emergency relief
(Crisp, 2003 and Vriese, 2006 ). Betts (2004) assumes that it was “a
north-south polarization in expectations and interests, and a lack of
commitment on the part of both donors and recipient states.” led to failure in
ACARA II.
A turning point in refugees’ livelihood has taken place in the beginning
of this century as more international attention is given to refugees in
protracted situations. Accordingly, UNHCR has become more involved and
proactive to find effective solutions. A series of initiatives were lunched in
this regard including ‘Convention Plus’, ‘Development Assistance to Refugees’
and ‘Development through Local Integration’.
The Executive Committee organised a special meeting of African states to
discuss the best approaches to effective solution for protracted refugees.
Following these initiatives the UNHCR established with other partners a
Self-Reliance Strategy for refugees in Uganda and launched in 2003 and the
development-oriented Zambia Initiative for refugees (Slaughter and Crisp,
2009).
Microenterprises (MEs) in normal situations play a vital role in poverty
reduction, economic growth, job creation, social stability and as a tool for
equitable income distribution. Moreover, they are perceived as an essential
factor to promote competition in the market, enhance productivity and technical
change, stimulate economic development
and enhance the welfare and standard of living of the many populations in the
society (Mukras,2003) ( Shahidan, 2011).
For refugees, microenterprises are direly needed in particular with
scarce job opportunities in most of the host countries especially when we know
that the majority of host countries are considered developing and poor countries with high rates of unemployment. Even in
developed countries employment is often difficult for many reasons including
language, cultural and religious barriers (Wolfington, 2006).
Microenterprises, through self- employment provide refugees with livelihood
security and economic self-reliance that will assist to reduce their
vulnerability in exile until they find a durable solution. Moreover,
microenterprises tap on refugees’ business skills, talents and rebuild their
income sources and significantly decrease their dependency on relief and aid.
Furthermore, supporting MEs greatly assist to overcome the sources of tension
with host communities (Jacobsen, 2002) (Silverman, 2013) (Abigail, 2011). In particular for refugees in urban areas who are considered as
‘invisible’ targets and accordingly they receive little or no assistance from
international agencies and donors who prefer to focus their efforts on more
visible targets in refugee camps (Loescher and Milner, 2009).
Advantages of microenterprises are not confined to refugees, all
stakeholders concerned about the refugee issues, in fact appreciate the
benefits of refugee microenterprises, including host countries and communities,
donor parties (countries, institutions and individuals) relief and aid NGOs and
agencies.
Microenterprise development programs for refugees are mostly organised
by NGOs and humanitarian agencies. Such programs aim at providing necessary
means for refugees to enhance their livelihood and achieve self-sufficiency.
The American Refugee
Committee (ARC) in its ‘Stepped Approach for Improving Livelihoods (SAIL)
defines Microenterprises programs as “programs whose objectives include both
the development of profitable Microenterprises for clients and the sustainable
provision of services that help microenterprises (credit, training, etc.).
These programs tend to be longer term and are employed in more stable
environments.” (ARC, n.d: 94). This definition includes start-up capital,
training and all other complementary services for the creation and development
of microenterprises. Thus, the programs comprise the financial as well as the
nonfinancial services such as training, consultation and monitoring. Most
institutions involved in microenterprises support for refugees provide both
types of services.
Several NGOs have
initiated microenterprises support programs for refugees. These organisations include Christian
Outreach, Relief and Development (CORD), International Rescue Committee
(IRC), the American Refugee Committee (ARC) Income-generating project of World
Relief in Maratane Refugee Camp, Nampula, Mozambique for refugees from central
Africa especially Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Burundi and
the International Relief and Development (IRD) in Lebanon, UNRWA for
Palestinians in Palestine’s neighboring countries, the Anglican Mission
Development Ministry (AMDM) in Gambia the International Rescue Committee (IRC)
in Kenya, World Relief in Mozambique, Arid Lands Development Focus (ALDEF), the
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORDA) in Kenya, Cooperative for Assistance and
Relief Everywhere (CARE), The Ugandan Women’s Effort to Save Orphans (UWESO) in
Uganda, Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) in South Africa.(Organizations’ websites,
2015)
Most of the programs offered by these NGOs operate in camp setting or in
rural settlements mostly in developing countries where the majority of the
world refugees exist. However, in developed countries where the number of
refugees who arrive by resettlement arrangements or by way of migration is
small, microenterprise programs are supported by central governments with the
aim of integrating the new comers into the society.
Empirical
evidences have
shown the significant impact of micro-enterprises programs on the
socio-economic situations of refugees. Many successful stories can be found in
the literature supporting the argument that when refugees are supported with
the positive business environment in host countries they are able to achieve
self-reliance and they can have a significant positive impact on the host
communities. To this effect, a study conducted by the American Refugee
Committee (ARC) reveals that 81% of start-up grants clients who did not apply
for further loans after the first one, mentioned business as their main source
of income. The study also shows that 91% of the clients, who took out basic
loans without first receiving grants, indicated business as their main source
of income. At the social level, 55% of basic loan clients have indicated that
their social status had improved, and 60% of them said that they had gained
pride, 60% were able to buy better clothes, 45% said they had more food, 47%
had become more self-reliant, 33% were healthier and 38% no longer had to
borrow money (Klerk and Nourse, 2004). Similar positive impacts were reported
on the CORD microcredit program in refugee camps in Zambia. There was a
significant increase in the income of the
beneficiaries, change in their diet and increase in the purchase of household
goods (Jacobsen
and Titus, 2004).
Another study
conducted in Keneya in 2010 by a team of researchers and commissioned by the
Norwegian, Kenyan and Danish governments found that annual turnover for refugees’
businesses in Dadaab camps reached about 2 billion shillings ($25 million).
Every year, Kenya earned about 218 million shillings ($3 million) just from
livestock and milk sales in the camps. On an annual per capita basis, the
combined economic benefits of refugees’ businesses represented an estimated 25%
of host community income in North Eastern Province (Enghoff et al., 2010). Kirk
(2004) assumes that refugees, as a group, have a higher proportion of human
capital skills than the population of their countries of origin and under the
right conditions refugees are very active entrepreneurs.
A socio-economic survey conducted in 2007, on Burundian refugees in
Tanzania, revealed that as a result of local enabling environment in the
district of Urambo District refugees occupied only about 2% of the total land
however their contribution in the Agricultural Production was 34%, the similar
results also are found in the district of Mpanda where the refugees
occupied 4% of the total land and their output was 42% of Agricultural
Production. (Nordic Consulting Group
Report (2010).
Despite all the initiatives and projects of livelihood and
microenterprise support, the gap between the demand and the offer is
considerably wide. In the previous examples, we take the case of ARC program in Guinea.
The number of beneficiaries of ARC program reached 4000 micro-entrepreneurs in
two years, however comparing this number to total number of refugees in Guinea,
the outreach level appears very low. The
United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (2001) estimated that at
the end of 2000 there were about 300,000 Sierra Leonean and 90,000 Liberian
refugees in Guinea. That means only four per cent of the refugees were covered
by the program in two years and only two per cent per year.
In a study conducted
by Jacobsen and Titus (2004:5) on the CORD’s programs for refugees in Zambia
the team found that among the challenges and constraints of CORD programs was
“the demand for loans of any size far exceeds the funds available for the
program.” Another very recent example is taken from the recent Syrian refugee
crisis. In the UNHCR recent livelihood programs for Syrian refugees,
beneficiaries of UNHCR and partner NGOs did not reach 1.5% of total number of
refugees as shown below in Table 1.1
Table 1.1 Syrian Refugee Beneficiaries of
UNHCR and Partner NGOs in Supporting Livelihood and Income Generating
Activities in Region Countries
Beneficiaries by
country |
total number of
refugees |
|
Turkey |
1000 |
1,758,092 |
Lebanon |
30,000 |
1.196,560 |
Iraq |
3270 |
249,861 |
Egypt |
5000 |
133,862 |
total |
39,270 (1.3 %) of total number |
3,338,375 (1.3 %) |
Source: UNHCR (2014f) and UNHCR (2015).
These
figures actually demonstrate the widening gap between the demand for livelihood
programs including microenterprise support and the actual available resources
and offered programs. Actually tremendous challenges are confronting
humanitarian agencies to promote economic involvement and income generating
projected for refugees.
OBJECTIVE AND
METHODOLOGY
OF THE STUDY
This study aims to explore the key challenges encountered
by aid and relief organizations to support refugee microenterprises. Six
semi-structured interviews have been conducted with a number of experts from
the following relief agencies and NGOs:
UNHCR, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(IFRC), Malaysian Social Research Institute (MISR), Islamic Aid Malaysia (IAM),
Islamic Relief Malaysia (IRM). According
to Abera (2012) the method of interviews in data collection is preferred due to
certain factors; first the high response rate compared to questionnaires.
Second: it gives the two people, interviewer and interviewee the opportunity to
interact more and get into specific details on the questions and answers.
Third: clarification of issues is easily achievable and that leads to accuracy
of data from the respondents. Interviews were conducted in the workplace of the
experts except for one interview that was conducted in a public place. The
duration of the interviews was one to one and a half hour. Afterwards,
interviews have been transcribed into print using word processing. The process
of data reduction has been undertaken after the transcription of the
interviews. Hence, data has been analytically examined and coded into main
issues, topics, categories and themes. Final themes are identified and
displayed in the following section.
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
Challenges
Encountering NGOs to Support Refugee MEs
Despite
all the benefits and advantages of microenterprises as highlighted earlier, and
despite the successful stories of refugee micro-entreprenuers, establishing and
developing microenterprises has always remained at minimum level among refugees
either in camp settings or outside camps. Many challenges and obstacles are
standing in the way of supporting and maintaining refugees’ microenterprises.
These challenges include legal, political, institutional, and financial
challenges (Ranalli, 2013). In this study,
participants in the interviews were requested to provide their opinions on the
challenges facing NGOs and relief agencies in supporting micro enterprises for
refugees. Below are some quotations from the statements of participants in the
interviews.
“In terms of
livelihood in general there are restrictions for refugees here in Malaysia
simply because there is no legal framework. Even though you mention the lack of
finance access to market all these come because one of the reasons is being no
legal framework, so in that sense they do not have access to anything.” (R1) “They
don’t have the ability to invest due to the legal framework. So that is the
main problem they are not legally allowed to own a business or to develop an
enterprise. so what NGOs can do things like developing skills of sewing or developing baking skills develop some form
of financial literacy but to take any further is often cannot.” (R5) “None of
the refugee or asylum seekers are allowed to work so the legal situation that
people are in basically prohibits doing any microfinance because it is not
legal according to the law of Malaysia. So the system does not give refugees
access to work. So if you give the refugees work or you provide them with the
micro financing you cannot protect them if they go to court.” (R3)
It is clear from the
quotations above that the legal restrictions on refugees have remained on top
of the challenges encountering NGOs involved in supporting refugee MEs. Such
restrictions may include depriving refugee of ownership rights, movement
freedom, access to work and employment. All these restrictions and others have
been well discussed in the literature in many studies including the following:
(Christensen and Harild, 2009; Jacobsen, 2004; Bartsch,
2003; Nourse, 2003; Azorbo, 2011; Lyon, Sepulveda, and Syrett, 2007 and UNHCR,
2014f).
Another equally
serious challenge for NGOs is represented in the continuity of displacement
crises around the globe and the limitation of resources available, most notably
the financial resources. To this effect R5 asserts that,
“One big challenge is
the scale especially if you talk about the Syrian refugees for instance you
have a scale of the need you have water needs food needs shelter needs health
needs those basic rights are prioritized they cost money to keep these services
functioning then the additional need is around the economic security self-
reliance and the ability to earn on your own income … the challenge is that the
financing system really more focusing on meeting those basic needs because
those are survival requirements if they are not met then the population falls
into potential malnutrition health issues etc. and if they are not focusing on
livelihood it is not going to be life threatening so I would say one of the issues
is financial.” (R5)
The above quotation
focuses on the financial challenge and the lack of resources. The unprecedented
scale of humanitarian crises around the globe, have made humanitarian agencies
become under great pressure to meet their relief goals and usually they
prioritize basic needs over any other development or livelihood projects (Slaughter
and Crisp, 2009; UNHCR, 2014; UNHCR,
2014a). With the increasing of humanitarian crises around the globe,
competition becomes fierce over the short financial resources available, in
such situations humanitarian agencies become under great pressure to meet their
relief goals and normally no resources remain left for any development or
long-term projects. The UNHCR announces a funding shortage of
about 81% as 24th April 2015 (http://data.unhcr.org). Fund shortages have forced UNHCR to announce considerable cuts in food
rations for refugees in Africa; such cuts have affected nearly 800,000
refugees. And very recently UNHCR announced a 40% cut in food rations for about
four million Syrian refugees (http://www.unhcr.org,
2014). Obviously, when humanitarian agencies do not have enough funds to feed
refugees, they will suspend or delay any development and livelihood programs.
This fact is clearly expressed in the recent report of UNHCR on Africa (2014:
161) which states that “As the majority of resources were dedicated to
emergencies and life-saving activities, only 15 per cent of the expenditure
went towards solutions and livelihood activities (UNHCR Global Report, 2014).
To put is in another
way, with the wide spread of humanitarian crisis and the decline of
international funds in particular in times of economic recession, the
humanitarian organisations become in a very critical situation. They become
obliged to prioritise the basic needs such as food, drink and shelter, over
other complementary programs including the livelihood and microenterprises
support programs. Consequently, the majority of refugees kept inactive, and
their potential remains untapped.
On the other hand, experts have raised the
issue of the high risk relating to providing micro financing to refugees. The
following quotations have discussed the challenge of credit risk and the
absence of any track record for the majority of refugees.
“Also you have the
challenge how to verify with the refugee if he is not a liar or compared to
Malaysia we have the data base for locals but have no
such data for refugees. For local people we can track their records and we can
ask local leaders but for refugees sometimes even the local leaders don’t know
may be because they are originally from different parts of their home country.”
(R6)
“The main challenge
for Muslim as well as non-Muslim NGO is the pay back so no NGO no organization
is willing to test the market to start
such a program so you do not know if these people you are going to support will
pay back or not.” (R4)
In the absence of
financial or tangible collateral, refugees in general are considered by
microfinance institutions as bad credit risks (Lascelles, 2012; Jacobsen 2006).
For instance, the social pressure or social capital that is normally used by
microfinance institutions as an alternative to financial collateral is useless
with refugees where individuals hardly know each other (Bartsch, 2003). Additionally,
it is believed that lack of trust make refugees unwilling to enter into groups
for loan and business purposes (Jacobsen, 2004). Nonetheless, the
implementation of group lending and other alternative such as the informal
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) in the case of refugees could
be studied in a separate future research because there is a strong argument of
the validity of such techniques for refugees in particular for refugees in
protracted situations when they spend many years in the same area and with the
same community. The next quotation will be discussing the issue of targeting
the right group of beneficiaries.
“Second challenge
would be targeting, let us say I have enough resources to support livelihood to
five hundred households how do I target those five hundred old (people)
effectively because I have a population of 100 thousand whom require livelihood
support so that is the challenge and so often we target the most vulnerable as
they are recognized they need more whether they are disabled women headed
household or elderly these are the traditional targeting criteria but they are
not necessarily be the most useful people to realise effective outcome of
livelihood being sustainable, as we know livelihood business or microenterprises
do fail the biggest entrepreneurs in the world have failed and so expecting
someone who is illiterate vulnerable non-business minded to suddenly succeed is
often the problem and so we usually target the most vulnerable when we should
be targeting the medium vulnerable but then the challenge for NGO explaining
why we are not helping the worse why helping the better-off that can be a
challenge.” (R5)
By and large, experts
have raised a very wide range of challenges as cited in the quotations above. On
top of these challenges is the financial challenge the default risk and the
absence of enabling environment. Actually, the majority of challenges
encountering micro enterprises in normal situations are also quoted in the
statement of the participants additionally the special situations of refugees
have raised a number of additional challenges for refugee micro entrepreneurs.
As clear in the quotations above, such challenges include the mobility of
refugees, the absence of track records for refugees, the absence of community
leaders and social collateral, high level illiteracy of refugees, language
barriers and most importantly the absence of experienced institutions to deal
with refugee micro enterprises and to provide microfinance for refugees. These
challenges are summarised below in Table 6.4.
Table 6.6 Challenges of Supporting Micro
Enterprises for refugees
Experts’ View |
Experts’ Reference |
a) Legal challenge: there is no legal
framework, refugees are not allowed to work or have a business - NGOs are not allowed to provide MF. |
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5R6 |
b) Financial challenge: lack of funds. |
R4 R6 R5 |
c) Pay back,
Default risk and absence of track record of refugees |
R6 R4 R2 |
d) Absence of Experienced Institution. |
R2R3R5 |
e) Attitude of host populations |
R2 R6 |
f) Language barrier |
R2R3 |
g) Competition from national and
international markets |
R1R5 |
h) Illiteracy of refugees |
R2 |
i) Sustainability of refugee micro
enterprises |
R1 |
j) Absence of community leaders |
R3 |
k) Mobility of refugees |
R4 |
l) Determine the Targeted population |
R5 |
The above challenges, highlighted by experts
in the interviews, are supported, to a far extent, by the literature regarding
supporting refugees’ microenterprises, in particular the challenges about legal
constraints, (Christensen and Harild, 2009; Jacobsen, 2004;
Bartsch, 2005; Nourse, 2003; Azorbo,
2011; Lyon, Sepulveda, and Syrett, 2007 and UNHCR, 2014f); the lack of
financial resources, (Slaughter and Crisp, 2009; UNHCR, 2014; UNHCR, 2014a);
attitude of host countries, (Jacobsen, 2002b; Crisp, 2003a; UNHCR, 2012;
Slaughter and Crisp, 2009:7); the issue of human capital, (The Handbook of Self-Reliance of UNHCR (2005:121) Nourse (2003); the
credit risk and lack of credit record for refugees, (Lascelles,
2012; Jacobsen 2006); mobility of refugees (Jacobsen 2006); the lack of experienced
institutions to provide assistance for refugees (Jacobsen,
2004; Nourse , 2003; Cavaglieri, 2005); the uncertainty of future that makes
refugees reluctant to set up a business, Cavaglieri ,2005) and finally the
challenge of the determination of target groups among refugees (Cavaglieri
(2005).
CONCLUSION
The current change in refugee trends around
the globe has made the existent relief and aid policies as ineffective and inefficient.
Despite the acknowledgment of the effectiveness of economic engagement of
refugees, livelihood projects and income generating activities have remained to
minimum levels among refugees. The majority of refugees spend many years in
exile unemployed, and unable to invest their skills and talent. This study has
been conducted to explore the current challenges encountering the relief and
humanitarian NGOs to promote economic engagement of refugee in particular
supporting microenterprises of refugees.
This study has found
that legal challenge and lack of financial resources have remained on top of
these challenges. The interviewed experts have additionally mentioned a long
list of other challenges less serious but valid challenges as listed above, including
high credit risk due to the absence of adequate securities and the absence of
track record of refugees, absence of experienced institution to provide micro
enterprise support, negative attitude of host populations, language barrier
lack of human capital among refugees and some other important challenges. Interestingly, this study has found that in
spite of all the challenges, refugee micro entrepreneurs have shown phenomenal
success in their microenterprises when the supportive environment in host countries
is available. More efforts are needed to channel the required support for
microenterprises of refugees as a key tool to promote self-sufficiency and
self-reliance of refugees. Host countries should be assisted to lift legal
constraints on refugees in terms of employment and economic activities and
instead try to make use of the human capital of refugees.
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